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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 




WESTERN PETROLEUM, INC., 
Defendant-Appellant & 
Cross-Respondent. 
CASE NO. 17178 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS 
AND BRIEF ON CROSS APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross-Appellants (hereafter designated 
plaintiffs) brought this action claiming damages for trespass, 
pollution of a culinary water well, emotional distress, punitive 
damages and requesting a permanent injunction. [Note: All 
references to the transcript (T.) shall be to the sequential 
pages (pg.) as numbered by the County Clerk, commencing with Page 
1 through 900.] 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried in part to the court and in part to the 
jury. The question of negligence per se was not presented to the 
jury. Rather, the court submitted certain questions to the jury 
which the jurors were required to answer. In effect, the trial 
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court treated the acts of the defendant as intentional torts and 
thus did not need to instruct the jury on the theories of 
negligence. The jury found that the dumping of certain 
"formation water" by the defendant caused 66% of the pollution of 
the plaintiffs' diligence well and 52% of the pollution of the 
plaintiffs' second well, which second well plaintiffs drilled 
because of the defendant's pollution of the diligence well. In 
each well, the remaining pollution was found to have been "caused 
by other parties or conditions." The jury was not asked to award 
damages as such, but rather to answer certain questions, without 
concern as to the legal effect of their answers. By answering 
all of the questions, the jury determined: the reasonable rental 
value of the plaintiffs' property without polluted wells and the 
rental value with the wells polluted; the amount of damages the 
plaintiffs sustained by reason of defendant's trespass; if 
plaintiffs were entitled 
amount the said punitive 
to punitive damages, and if so, the 
damages should be; if plaintiffs had 
suffered damages for mental suffering, dis comfort and annoyance 
resulting from the defendant's pollution of their wells, and that 
plaintiffs were entitled to $10,000 for the same. The trial 
court originally awarded plaintiffs judgment based on all of the 
findings of the jury. Several months later, after some 
considerable delay and several motions by defendant, etc., the 
court entered an amended judgment, based on all of the findings 
of the jury, except on the finding of mental suffering in the sum 
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of $10,000.00, which damage the trial court then determined to 
disallow because: 
no separate cause of action for the tort of emotional 
distress was plea or proved by plaintiffs or if pled or 
proved that it was disallowed by the court on the 
additional ground that the jury was not adequately 
instructed on the question of such damages and 
therefore, the question was improperly framed for the 
jury or was framed in such a manner that the jury was 
allowed to improperly speculate as to such award and 
amount •. (See Amended Special Verdict, T. Pgs. 270-72) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross Appellants seek to have this 
court affirm fully ~ll. findings made ~~~and thus of the 
trial court, including the jury finding that plaintiffs are 
entitled to damages for mental suffering in the sum of 
$10,000.00. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs believe that in order for the court to better 
understand th is case, the statement of facts suggested by the 
defendants should be amplified as follows: 
This conflict involves intentional torts of trespass and the 
invasion of rights, i.e., "pollution of water," on property 
situated about 2 miles north of Roosevelt. Defendant purchased 
its 40 acres, which is just north of plaintiffs' property, in 
December, l975. Defendants' property is primarily situated at an 
elevation of approximtely 200-300 feet higher than plaintiffs' 
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property, on what is known locally as "Harmston Bench." Neither 
plaintiffs' nor defendant's property is considered "farm land." 
Although part of plaintiffs' land is used for pasture and garden. 
Defendant's property was previously used as a "gravel pit." 
Since 1975, defendant used its property for the disposal of 
"formation water.• Formation water is waste or extra or 
unnecessary water removed from oil wells during the production of 
oil. It contains high levels of salts, chemicals and other 
objectionable materials, 
formation water is fit 
including oil 
for human use. 
and gas. None of this 
Plaintiffs' land is 
situated south of and at a considerably lower elevation than that 
of defendant. Plaintiffs' land is also in the direct flow or 
run-off line from defendant's property for the normal and natural 
drainage of water. 
Plaintiffs purchased their property in December, 1976, for 
the sum of $37,000.00. Included in the purchase was 21 acres of 
ground, the "diligence" well, some out buildings, and an older 
home. The plaintiffs proceeded to make at least $60,000.00 (T. 
pg. 493, lines 4-15) worth of improvements to the home and 
premises. Culinary water for said home was furnished by the 
"diligence well" which had been in use since prior to 1929. From 
1929 to December, 1976, the water from said well had been 
described as being sweet to the taste and of high quality. (T. 
pgs. 340, 341, 343 & 344). This well water was used to maintain 
a Grade "A" Dairy (T. pg. 367), and later a Grade "B" Dairy, both 
- 4 -
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of which required the water to be approved by the appropriate 
State agencies for health purposes. (T. pgs. 468, 515). When the 
plaintiffs bought the land, the water had a good taste to it and 
they had no difficulty using it. (T. pg. 347, lines 8-11). By 
February, 1977, the plaintiffs noticed that the water began to 
have a peculiar smell and taate, that they could not get soap to 
make- suds in it; that they couldn't wash their_ bodies clean, and 
that there was a distinctive smell of petroleum products to the 
'water. (T. pg. 347, lines 12-26). Branches further made a visual 
search of their property and found water percolating from the 
adjoining property belonging to the defendant (T. pg. 486, lines 
24-29). They requested the defendant to cease and desist from 
dumping formation water so as to allow it to escape onto 
plaintiffs' property, but the defendant did nothing. Plaintiffs 
involved the State Sanitarian in the matter. Letters were 
delivered to the defendant's agent, George Gross, but still 
nothing was done about the problem. (T. pg. 358, lines 22-30, Ex. 
P-38; Pg. 402). Plaintiffs commenced legal action and sought to 
enjoin the defendants from further dumping on the property. 
However, defendant required plaintiff to post a $3,000.00 per day 
bond for each day that dumping was stopped and plaintiff was 
unable to raise the finances to do the same. (T. pg. 394). 
Defendant is a million dollar corporation (T. pg. 483, lines 11-
12), and its agents admitted that it could have dumped the 
formation water at other approved locations, but 4idn't because 
- 5 -
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defendant would have had to pay a 25% surcharge to the owners of 
said pits (T. pg. 610, lines 1-5). Because defendant chose to 
ignore plaintiffs' requests and continued to dump formation water 
on its property, plaintiffs had to haul water for culinary use 
almost continuously from March, 1977 to the time of the trial (T. 
pg. 358, lines 22-30, pg. 359, lines 21-29). Plaintiffs lost 
their rabbits and 100 chickens from drinking the polluted water. 
Defendant's agents admitted that they did not know what the law 
was nor did they make any attempt to check the law relative to 
the dumping of formation waters (T. pg. 482). Dumping of 
formation waters is governed by Title 73-14-5 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. (See also, T. pg. 413). After 
defendant became aware of the laws relative to said dumping, 
defendant still took no affirmative action or steps to correct 
the same or to receive approval for further dumping. In fact, 
according to testimony of the defendant's agent, George Gross, no 
real steps were taken to secure approval of another site from the 
State of Utah until September of 1979, approximately two (2) 
weeks prior to the trial, and 30 months after plaintiffs' first 
protests (T. pg. 610, lines 5-30, pg. 611, 1-22). 
Shortly after plaintiffs began complaining about the 
encroachment and trespass of defendant's polluted and 
contaminated water upon their land, defendant offered to build a 
pond on its property to contain the water from flowing down a 
gulch on plaintiffs' property which was below the hillside at one 
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of the locations where water had been percolating out (T. pg. 
602, lines 9-14). Defendant, without seeking to establish its 
own boundary 1 ines, entered upon the plaintiffs' property some 
50-60 feet and then for another 80-100 feet, proceeded to build a 
pond entirely on plaintiffs' land. This pond:acted as a partial 
containment of the water running onto plainti£f's land (T. pg. 
353, lines 13-20) .- Plaintiffs had to hire a surveyor to prove to 
defendant that the pond was built on their land. With this 
knowledge, defendant built another containment pond on its own 
property. Neither containment pond was sufficient to retain the 
continued percolation of the water from trespassing onto 
plaintiffs' property. In fact, during the .dryest time of the 
year, the water could be found 50-60 feet downhill and beyond the 
containment pond on plaintiffs' property, for a net encroachment 
of at least 200 feet inside plaintiffs' property. The rest of 
the tim~ this polluted water would run several hundred more feet 
onto plaintiffs' property, usually reaching plaintiffs' wellhead 
and outer buildings. Once it even ran into the plaintiffs' 
basement, causing damage to the plaintiffs' food storage (T. Pg. 
350, lines 25-30; Pg. 351, lines 1-5; Pg. 372, lines 5-25). 
During the summer of 1977, defendant's trucks entered across the 
neighbors property and onto_ .the plaintiffs' property for the 
purpose of pumping out the containment ponds. However, once they 
were -load~d-, - the trucks would go across plainJ;.iffs' land with 
their discharge no2zles open, spraying the water on plaintiffs' 
- 7 -
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land, thus spreading the pollutants along the surface. The 
continued pressure of the blatant attitude and trespass by the 
defendant as well as the inability to have culinary water in her 
home, caused plaintiff Jeanne Branch, in particular, a great deal 
of emotional difficulty. It resulted in her leaving her husband 
for a three or four month period to go "back" to the plaintiffs' 
original home in Colorado so she could "pull herself together" 
(T. pg. 375, lines 1-14: pg. 385, lines 17-18; pg. 489, lines 9-
14; pg. 799, lines 9-20; pg. 801, lines 13-20). During this 
period of time her husband made weekly trips to and from Colorado 
to be with his family and spent a great deal of time talking to 
his wife on the telephone while he maintained his contracting 
business in Roosevelt (T. pg. 810, lines 1-18). 
In November, 1977, plaintiffs dug an additional well south 
of their home, (Exs. P-17 & 18) had the same tested and found it 
to have a satisfactory low level of suspended solids, such as to 
be able to be used for culinary purposes. At that time the water 
was tested and was found to have approximately 280 or less parts 
of suspended solids per million, which was well within the range 
of 500 parts of suspended solids per million established by the 
public health service as acceptable for human use (T. pg. 669, 
lines 13-14). Water from the new well continued to be useable 
until approximately February of 1978, at which time the water 
ceased to be useable or drinkable by humans. Suspended solids 
per million then rose to just under 1000 and upon advice of the 
- 8 -
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State Health Department, the. plaintiffs ceased to use said water 
for eating, drinking, etc. (T. pgs. 369-70). Now both wells were 
polluted. 
Both parties introduced expert witnesses who testified as to 
the manner in which the pollution might be reachi,ng the culinary 
water supply of the plaintiffs. Both experts agreed that to some 
extent the formation water from the defendant's pit was entering 
the plaintiffs' water supply. The means by which and the extent 
to which it was penetrating the plaintiffs' water system were 
their main points of difference. Plaintiffs called Mr. Bryce 
Montgomery, a geologist for the Utah Division of Water Resources. 
The defendant called Mr. Ferris, a private geologist. Mr. 
Montgomery and Mr. Ferris were diametrically opposed in their 
opinions as to the manner in which "surface" water could enter 
into the culinary water-producing "Duche~ne formation." Appellant 
in its Statement of Facts set forth the theories advanced by its 
witness, Mr. Ferris. How~ver, Mr. Ferris acknowledged that 
despite all of his "testing," he was hypothesizing as to what the 
results might be (T. pg. 668, lines 28-30). The jury, as trier 
of the fact, apparently believed Mr. Montgomery, who, as a State 
Geologist had made a hydrology study, with several water te&ts, 
irr the area over a two year period. Further, Mr •. nontgomery had 
been a practicing geologist for over 20 years. and had worked 
extensively in Utah, the past nine ( 9) years of ·,which was for..: the 
Utah Division of Water Resources (T. pg. 367). Mr. Ferris, 
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though, was a comparative new-comer to the area with less than 
two (2) years experience in the Rocky Mountain area (T. pg. 377). 
Apparently, his theories were not believed by the jury. This 
assumption is based upon the answers the jury gave to the 
questions that were propounded to them by the court. Mr. Ferris 
held the theory that there was no way that surf ace waters could 
enter into the culinary water producing Duchesne formation. fu 
the contrary, Mr. Montgomery testified, from his experience, that 
pollution and surface waters could and would enter the Duchesne 
formation through wells that were not properly plugged and 
through natural "joining or cracks" {T. pg. 538, lines 6-18) and 
if it entered through natural joints and.cracks it could take up 
to two (2) years to travel from defendant's property to 
plaintiffs' property. It is only logical that by whatever means 
the polluted water enters, since the water with the larger number 
of suspended solids per million weighs more than good quality 
culinary water, the heavier or polluted water will settle to the 
bottom or lowest level it can reach. Defendant makes much of the 
fact that there could be many possible sources of contamination 
of the plaintiffs' culinary water system. Plaintiffs never 
denied that. Plaintiffs argued to the jury that there are both 
natural and unnatural sources of contamination, as was suggested 
by the experts. In fact, public health standards acknowledge 
that culinary water can safely have up to 500 parts of suspended 
solids per million, without a threat to health. The jury, after 
- 10 -
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listening to the facts presented by both parties, made a 
determination as to what percentage of the pollution or 
contamination was being introduced into each of the plaintiffs' 
wells by the defendant, as well as what percentage by other 
sources. 
Plaintiffs assert that the court improperly found that 
plainti~fs' claim for damages for emotional distress must either 
be considered and plead as a "separate tort," and/or that 
plaintiffs had not properly plead the issue of emotional 
distress, etc. In plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action of their 
Second Amended Complaint, which was mailed to defendant's counsel 
on the 26th of February, 1979, that issue was., clearly plead. 
(See T. pg. 41, paragraphs 11-13). Defendant responded to the 
same with its answer to plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint on 
April 25, 1979. (See T. pg. 46, paragraphs 11, 12, 13). Whether 
sufficient proof was offered or whether the jury was adequately 
instructed, will be discussed in Point VI hereafter. 
- 11 -
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, THE 
INSTRUCTIONS BY THE COURT WERE SUFFICIENT AND 
NO ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS WERE NECESSARY 
A. BACKGROUND 
It is granted that one of the exact legal issues in dispute, 
which arose out of defendant's intentional trespass and pollution 
of plaintiffs' underground water system by the intentional and 
reckless dumping of format ion waters in a pit, has not been 
considered ~ ~ by the Utah Supreme Court. Similar issues, 
however, have been considered in Utah, and basically the same 
issue has been settled by several jurisdictions other than only 
the states of Oklahoma and Texas suggested by defendant. [See 
Edwards v. Talent Irrigation District, 570 P.2d 1169, 280 Or. 307 
(1977); Drake ~Smith, 337 P.2d 1059 (Wash. 1959); 142 A.L.R. 
1322; 28 A.L.R. 2d 1075, 1087 (1953).] These jurisdictions do 
not treat the tort committed by the defendant in the manner nor 
reach the same conclusions that defendant now urges. 
B. NEGLIGENCE INSTRUCTION INAPPROPRIATE 
From a reading of plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (See 
T. pgs. 39-44), it is obvious that the plaintiffs proceeded on 
the basis of an intentional tort, i.e., trespass, alleging that 
defendant had acted with an intentional disregard for the safety 
and well-being of the plaintiffs' property and personal rights, 
by persisting in dumping formation waters in an unlawful manner. 
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Defendant's brief makes much of the point that it is a "common 
practice to dispose of formation waters by dumping them in pits." 
Plaintiffs cannot object or disagree with that, but respond that 
the statutes of this State (§78-14-5, U.C.A., 1953) are clear and 
complete as to the obligation of the defendant to receive prior 
appreval of the sites where such water is dumped.-. In short, 
defendant's brief ignores. the fact that the law requires that 
"formation waters" and all other -- polluted or contaminated 
substances, be dumped in accordance with the laws and regulations 
of the State of Utah and that the dumping site have prior 
approval. Defendant's agents claimed they had no knowledge of 
said law, to which plaintiffs retort "ignorance of the law is no 
excuse." It is incredible that individuals engaged in a million 
dollar or more business of "dumping formation waters" did not 
believe their activity could be governed by appropriate laws and 
statutes - even after the law was brought to their attention. 
Appellant's brief persists in the idea that the claim of the 
plaintiffs and the judgment of the aourt was based on the theory 
of negligence. Plaintiffs' position is that defendant was 
strictly liable for the results of its act of intentionally 
conducting an ultra hazardous activity in disregard_of applicable 
state law. Therefore, negligence, ~ se, was no~ or should not 
have been the issue. Over plaintiffs' objections defendant 
insisted '-that negligence should be the theory upon which the 
dispute was to be submitted to the jury. At the end of the 
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trial, while the jury was considering the matter, the following 
exchange occurred between plaintiffs' counsel and the court: 
Court: You mean the question of the negligence is not 
a proper question in this case? 
Mr. Mangan: Yes, because the question of negligence is 
not a proper 
The court: And the record will show we discussed that 
prior hereto, the court has not fully made up its mind 
in that regard and in order to preserve the defendant's 
theory of the case, .!. thought it would not be harmful 
to ~ubmit the question ~ the ~ For that reason it 
has been submitted, but the matter is still open. 
Mr. Mangan: And for that purpose, your honor, I also 
object to the instructions on negligence for that 






6, 7 and 8 is n' t it. Oh, you mean the 
And ~ object to the question of 
(emphasis added). ('i':"""" pg. 877, lines 16-
Thus, the theory of negligence is one propounded by the defendant 
and objected to by the plaintiffs on the basis that the defendant 
should be strictly liable for its conduct. Plaintiffs requested 
the court to instruct the jury on the issue of strict liability. 
Plaintiffs desired the court to determine or rule as a matter of 
law that reasonable men do not do lawful acts in an unlawful 
manner, i.e., they do not dump formation water, which is a lawful 
act, without complying with the laws of the State of Utah as to 
site, manner of dumping, etc. The defendant insisted on dumping 
at an unapproved and hazardous site despite warnings from 
plaintiffs and others from and after February, 1977, to the time 
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of the trial, i.e., over 32 months. In fact, defendant continued 
to dump for nearly one (1) month after the trial. The 
plaintiffs' theory of the wrong was not founded on negligence, 
but upon strict liability as defendant intentionally conducted a 
dangerous activity, contrary to state law, which trespassed upon 
property of plaintiffs. The question then is simply whether 
defendant "caused" the pollution, trespass, etc., complained of 
by plaintiffs. The question properly to be submitted to the jury 
was simply that of causation. 
C. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IS INAPPLICABLE. 
An instruction on comparative negligence is only appropriate 
where there is some substantial evidence upon which the jury 
could make a finding of either negligence on the part of 
plaintiff, contributing to the harm, or else that the trespass of 
defendant was unavoidable and was an accident. [See Chrysler 
Corp. ~Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123, 1135 (Wyom, 1978); Hasson v. 
ford Motor Co., 564 P.2d 857, 868 (Cal, 1977); Woodhouse v. 
Johnson, 436 P.2d 442 (Utah, 1968); Johnson v. Hartvigsen, 373 
P.2d 908 (Utah, 1962)]. Although urged by defendant at the time 
of the trial, the court rightly ruled that there was, as a matter 
of law, no substantial evidence to support the position that 
defendant's trespass was either unavoidable or an accident. 
The harm done to plaintiffs, i.e., the tort committed by 
defendant, arose from both nuisance and trespass. For the sake 
of argument, let it be assumed that plaintiffs could perhaps have 
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better "sealed" their wells from defendant's contaminants - the 
fact still is that plaintiffs were under no alleged or tendered 
d~y to do so. Defendant absolutely had no right to dump, dispose 
of1. etc., oil field "wastes," foundation water, etc., in such a 
manner that the pollutants could pass or trespass upon or into 
plaintiffs' land and culinary water. Were the court to have 
instructed the jury that the .negligence of plaintiffs must be 
measured by reason of their not anticipating and preparing for 
defendant's interference with plaintiffs' right to the exclusive 
possession, use and enjoyment of their lands, then a reversable 
miscarriage of justice would have resulted. As a matter of law, 
any alleged "negligence" of plaintiff was irrelevant as to 
defendant's trespass and disregard of plaintiffs' rights. 
The defendant's acts were neither accidental nor 
unavoidable,. They were intentional and avoidable. There--was, as 
a matter of law, no substantial evidence upon which a reasonable 
jury could have based a finding of negligence by the plaintiffs. 
To have submitted such a question or instruction to the jury, in 
light of the evidence before the court, would have, at best, 
confused and mislead the jury, and, in any event, have 
constituted error. 
D. PROXIMATE CAUSE INSTRUCTION INAPPROPRIATE. 
The use of the word "cause" by a lay juror would undoubtedly 
meaf'lr at the very least, "cause in fact." Assuming. that the 
court did err as urged by defendants, in failing to instruct the 
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jury as to "proximate cause," such error must be· disregarded 
under Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states 
that "the court at every stage of the proceedings must disregard 
any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties." Defendant has entirely 
failed to show that the failure to give an instruction on 
proximate cause affected its substantial rights. 
For a proximate cause instruction to be relevant, defendant 
would first have to establish some evidence that plaintiffs were 
in some way negligent. This cannot be done because defendant did 
rrot and could not· -point to any duty, owed , by plaintiffs to 
defendant, that plaintiffs allegedly breached. If we assume, for 
the sake of argument, that plaintiffs' negligence could first be 
established, then defendant could argue that although it too was 
a "cause" of the trespass and pollution to plaintiff's culinary 
water supply in the percentages found by the jury, nevertheless 
plaintiffs' negligence was an intervening and/or a superceeding 
cause, thereby making plaintiffs' negligence, rather than 
defendant's, the proximate cause of the injury to plaintiff. Of 
course, such a situation, as defendant contends, would best be 
dealt with by applying the comparative- negligence law, rather 
than delving into· the abyss ·wh-ich is the- theory of proximate 
cause. 
In this case, an instruction as to proximate cause is 
inappropriate for the same reason that comparative negligence is 
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inapplicable. Defendant had a duty to refrain from interfering 
with plaintiffs' exclusive use, enjoyment, and possession of 
their property. Defendant intentionally and knowingly breached 
its duty, and, therefore, was either strictly liable for the 
damages that flowed from its conduct, or at the very least, 
negligent. By awarding punitive damages against defendant, the 
jury found defendant's disregard of the law and of the personal 
and property rights of plaintiffs to be sufficiently reckless to 
constitute willfulness or malice, and, therefore, for defendant 
to be strictly liable to plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs, however, owed no duty to anticipate and prepare 
for the trespassing or pollutants of defendant. Since plaintiffs 
breached no duties as a matter of law, they could not be found 
negligent by any jury. To instruct the jury as to "proximate 
cause" would only have resulted in confusing the jurors. 
E. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AGAINST ROSS. 
Whether plaintiffs may also recover damages from their 
second well-driller, Ross, in another act ion is totally 
irrelevant here. If Ross also had a duty to plaintiffs, and Ross 
breached the same, and said breach resulted in damage to 
plaintiffs, then plaintiffs have a right to recover from Ross the 
damage he caused. If, hypothetically speaking, plaintiffs 
anticipated defendant's trespass, and hired Ross to defend 
against the same, and Ross failed to do so, then Ross is liable 
to plaintiffs for the damages caused by his failure. However, 
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Ross' failure does not relieve defendant of its liability to 
plaintiffs inasmuch as plaintiffs still had no duty to anticipate 
and defend against defendant's trespassing. Regardless of how 
Ross drilled the well, it. was defendant's pollutants that made 
the water unuseable. 
Defendants entirely misspeak the facts, however, in alleging 
that plaintiffs were suing a third party (Ross) for drilling the 
second well in a negligent or defective manner. The facts are 
that plaintiffs paid Ross for the second well and used it for a 
few months. ' The ~ Ross installed in the second well 
malfunctioned and plaintiffs had Ross do subsequent or follow-up 
work on the pump in the second well. A dispute arose as to what 
the charges or costs should o.be for such work. Plaintiffs felt 
that Ross had over-billed them and then wrongfully liened their 
property for an amount far in excess of the value of the work 
done. Plaintiffs also reasonably believed that Ross' efforts 
should have been "warranty" work, and sued Ross to remove his 
lien, etc. Clearly the plaintiffs' dispute· with Ross has nothing 
to do with the issues before this court. 
F. SUMMARY ON CAUSATION. 
The trial court correctly stated to counsel in chambers 
during the trial the current and better reasoned opinion relative 
to the terms "cause," "causation," "proximate cause," etc.J 
namely, that there are a variety of definitions and applications 
of the term. What we are dealing "w,ith in Branch v. Western 
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Petroleum is the simple question, "has the conduct of the 
defendant caused the plaintiffs harm?" This is a question of 
fact. It is a matter upon which a layman is as competent to sit 
in judgment as the most experienced court. Causation is a fact. 
It is a matter of what happened. By adding to the jury 
instructions such legalistic terms as "proximate cause," "sole 
cause," or "dominant cause," we tend only to mislead and confuse 
a jury, especially in a case like this one. (See Prosser, 
Handbook of the Law of Torts, 1971, pgs. 236-250). This jury was 
well instructed, very diversified and competent; it should be 
presumed that the jury understood what the term "cause" means in 
our language, and found accordingly. 
In short, when we clear the sophistry of legalisms aside, 
the trial court did not commit error in refusing to confuse the 
jury by instructing further on the issues of either negligence or 
proximate cause, etc. If any error did occur, it was by even 
suggesting the term "negligence" to the jury, as indicated above. 
- 20 -
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POINT II 
A FINDING OF A PERCENTAGE OF NEGLIGENCE OF 
THE PLAINTIFFS WOULD NEITHER BE PROPER NOR 
HELPFUL, AND IS NOT MANDATED BY UTAH LAW 
UNDER. THE FACTS OF THIS DISPUTE. 
A. FAILURE TO INSTRUCT.WOULD BE "HARMLESS ERROR." 
Plaintiffs. believe that even if there was an error by the 
trial court in not instructing the jury as to.plaintiff's alleged 
negl igen.ce, the same would be in the category of .harmless error, 
and therefore must be disregarded under Rule 61 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff further points out that any 
alleged negligence of plaintiff is.na d.efense to willful, wanton, 
or reckless misconduct of a defendant. [See Ferguson ~ Jongsma, 
350 P.2d 404 (Utah, 1960); Butane Corp. ~Kirby, 187 P.2d 325 
(Ariz., 1948); Ewing~ Cloverleaf Bowl, 572 P.2d 1155 (Calif, 
1978) l . 
B. AN INSTRUCTION ON COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE OR PLAINTIFFS' 
NEGLIGENCE, UNDER THESE FACTS WOULD BE REVERSABLE ERROR. 
Defendant's urging of the application of the comparative 
negligence statute (§78-27-38) to this case presupposes that 
plaintiffs' claim only lies in a "negligence" act, and ignores 
plaintiffs' theory and pleading of defendant's intentional 
trespass and/or reckless disregard of plaintiffs' rights, etc., 
resulting in de.f.endant. being strictly liable to plaintiffs. The 
Wyoming Court stated in Chrysler Corp. ~ Todorovich, 580 P.2d 
1123, (Wyom, 1978)]: 
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it is prejudicial error to give instructions on 
contributory negligence if defense of such negligence 
is not supported by substantial evidence. (Cit. 
Omitted). The same rule would apply with respect to 
negligence of a plaintiff in a comparative negligence 
context. (at pg. 1135)(emphasis added). 
Defendant neither tendered nor offered any substantial evidence 
of plaintiffs' negligence or that plaintiffs contributed to the 
pollution of their well. Theories and suggestions of what 
"might" have happened or how the surface water "could have" 
entered the well, certainly is not evidence of negligence. 
By reading instruction #10, and the jury's answer to 
Question #15, it is obvious that since the jury awarded 
$10,000.00 punitive damages against defendant, the jury found 
defendant's conduct to be in reckless disregard of the rights and 
property of plaintiffs, and therefore defendant's conduct was, as 
a matter of law, wilful or with malice. Comparative negligence 
does not apply to such a factual case. It would be like 
comparing apples and oranges to try to equate, on a percentage 
basis, any negligence of plaintiffs with defendant's willful and 
wanton actions or reckless disregard of the rights of the 
plaintiffs. 
C. PLAINTIFFS OWED NO DUTY TO PROTECT AGAINST DEFENDANT'S 
INTENTIONAL ACTS. 
The issues in Branch v. Western Petroleum are whether 
defendant violated the rights of plaintiffs, and, if so, to what 
extent plaintiffs were damaged. While defendant hypothecated as 
to different sources of pollution, the evidence was clear that 
- 22 -
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defendant was the only active agent in accomplishing either the 
trespass or creating the polluting nuisance. Plaintiffs are not 
negligent simply because they did not foresee defendant's 
disregard of 
countermeasures. 
their rights and take sufficient defensive 
Defendant had no right to pollute plaintiffs' 
wells or dump anything that would go onto plaintiffs.' property. 
Whether better well casing or installation could have lessened 
the damage to plaintiffs is totally irrelevant, as defendant had 
no right, at all, to do what it did. Plaintiffs were under no 
obligation to anticipate defendant's "reckless disregard" of 
their rights to the ... exclusive possession and enjoyment of their 
land and culinary water. 
Defendant 'insi:'sted from the onset of the trial that the 
court should instruct the jury on the issue of comparative 
negligence. The trial court stated that it felt the instruction 
urged by defendant was inappropriate and not applicable, but 
invited the defendant to produce any authority· to the contrary. 
Defendant did not then and does not on appeal present the 
requisite authority to establish the need for the instruction. 
D. RESTATEMENT'S POSITION ON ALLOCATION. 
Perhaps, if any apportionment or allocation of damages 
should occur, then the better reasoned approach to allocation of 
damages is set forth in the Restatement of Torts, Second §4338 
(1965). under that approach, once'-·plaintiffs have met their 
burden of proving the defendant's tortious pollution caused harm, 
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the defendant wrongdoer has the burden of proving the proper 
allocation of the damages. In Branch v. western Petroleum, the 
defendant did not meet this burden. The plaintiffs argued 
allocation to the jurors in their closing argument, (See T. pgs. 
818, 865). The argument is set forth in Point III hereafter. 
In short plaintiffs' argument was that in the absence of 
defendant's pollution, plaintiffs' diligence well would be safe 
for human consumption. 
E. SUMMARY. 
In short, not only is the requested instruct ion improper, 
but the findings of the jury precludes the necessity of 
considering the issue of proximate cause or of comparative 
negligence any further, and defendant's appeal should fail on the 
same. 
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POINT III 
INASMUCH AS DEFENDANT'S POLLUTION OF 
PLAINTIFFS' WATER RENDERED THE WATER 
UNUSEABLE, THERE IS NEITHER MERIT NOR EQUITY 
IN REDUCING THE AMOUNT TO BE AWARDED TO 
PLAINTIFFS 
Plaintiffs referred to this argumell;t in Point II above. It 
is as follows: 
A. All the experts agreed that culinary well water in the 
subject area "naturally" had some solids [pollutants] in it; 
B. Federal health .. atandards indicate ~hat 500 parts of 
solids [pollutants] per mil.lion is the highes.~ "safe." level (T. 
pg. 669, lines 13 & 14); 
C. Based on the hist~rLc use of plaintiffs' diligence well, 
the water was normally safe for human use and consumption; 
D. The latest chemical test (Sept., 1979) of plaintiffs' 
diligence well indicated that it still contained approximately 
980 parts of solids [pollutants] per million (M.), which was very 
similar to the amount in the water in March;.,; 1977; 
E. Based on the jury's finding (Answer to Question #4), 
since defendant was responsible for 66% of the solids or 
pollutants in plaintiffs' diligence well then defendant 
introduced approximately 646.8 parts of the 980 solids per M. in 
that well. Approximately 333. 2 parts per M. was there from 
either natural or other means. 
F. Plaintiffs' diligence well would thus meet acceptable 
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health standards, but for defendant's introduction of 
approximately 646.8 parts of solds per M. into that well; 
G. The latest chemical tests from plaintiffs' new well 
indicated that it contained approximately 920 parts of solids or 
pollutants per M.; 
H. Based on the jury's findings (Answer to Question #9), 
that defendant was responsible for 52% of the solids or 
pollutants in plaintiffs' new well, then defendant introduced 
approximately 478.4 parts of the 920 solids per M. in that well, 
and 441.6 parts were there from either natural or other means; 
I. Plaintiffs' new well would meet acceptable health 
standards, but for defendant's introduction of approximately 
478.4 parts of solids per M. into that well. 
Thus, but for the actions of the defendant, both of 
plaintiffs' wells would have met acceptable health standards. 
Defendant should be responsible for the full consequences that 
naturally flow from its' tortious conduct. Based on the findings 
of the jury, plaintiffs could have satisfactorily used the water 
from either of their wells in the absence of defendant's 
pollutants. There is no evidence that there was any other person 
or party, other than defendant, contributing to the pollution in 
plaintiff's wells. Since plaintiffs' water would be acceptable 
without defendant's pollutants, defendant should be fully liable 
for all of the damages awarded to the plaintiffs. 
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POINT IV 
THE SO-CALLED EXCLUSION OF "ELK HUNTERS" AS 
JURORS WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANT AND 
WAS NOT A SUBSTANTIAL FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH 
THE LAW 
A. ANY ERROR WAS NEITHER "SUBSTANTIAL" NOR Pa&JUDICIAL. 
Defendant allege~ that the procedure used by the Duchesne 
County Clerk'& office to impanel the jury in this cas~,~ialated 
the requirements of Section 78-46-13, Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
as amended. However, Seq.tion 78-46-16 requires that~for relief 
to .:be granted for violatiQn of the first named se~tion, there 
must be both ( 1) a "substant:ial,~failure" to comply with this act, 
and (2) "actual and substantial injustice and prejudice" must 
result. 
Assuming arguendo that such conduct by. either or both the 
clerk's office or the sheriff's office, as suggested by 
defendant, actually took place in selecting the jurors, and 
further assuming that, by some stretch of the imagination, said 
conduct was found by this court to constitute a- substantial 
failure to comply with the statute, defendants would still have 
to show that such an irregularity as eliminating potential "elk 
hunters," caused "actual and substantial injustice and prejudice" 
to the defendant. Plaintiffs urge that defendant has made no 
serious attempt to show that it has sustained •actual and 
substantial injustice and prejudice." If it has, plaintiffs 
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cannot readily perceive the same. 
Certainly elk hunters are not the type of class or group, 
the exclusion of which would tend to evidence discrimination or 
tend to make the jury other than what it was, i.e., fair, 
competent and impartial. Elk hunters are drawn from all 
religious, cultural, racial, sexual, and socio-economic classes. 
Certainly elk hunters, as a group, cannot be presumed to be more 
sympathetic to activities of a company which may tend to infringe 
on the rights of neighboring land owners than the population at 
large. It is a general rule in criminal cases that a conviction 
will not be reversed or verdict set aside, unless error in the 
selection of the jury was more than merely a disregard of a 
formal provision of the law regarding the manner of jury 
selection, and the moving party can show "actual prejudice," so 
that a "fair and impartial jury was not selected." [See the 
decisions regarding selections of jurys in criminal cases State 
~Welt, 419 P.2d 101 (Ariz, 1966); State~ McGee, 370 P.2d 261 
(Ariz, 1962), cert. den. 371 US 844; State~ Dodge, 365 P.2d 798 
(Utah, 1961)]. Surely, a more exacting standard would be 
required in selecting a jury in criminal cases than is required 
in civil cases. Since, under the facts of Branch v. Western 
Petroleum, the standards established in criminal cases would not 
require a new trial, no greater standard should be required in a 
civil case. In the present case, 
show prejudice from the fact that 
- 28 -
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concern for the Duchesne County taxpayers, neglected to require a 
few persons, with firm elk hunting plans, to appear for jury 
selection because of the clerk's experience that such persons 
would probably be excused by the court. 
B. DEFENDANT "PASSED THE. JtJRY FOR CAUSE .... 
In any event, it is to be recalled that after the court and 
counsel for both parties had voir dired the prospective jurors, 
and all individuals with potential conflicts of any kind were 
excused, counsel for both parties passed the jury for cause. 
Defendant should not now be heard to say that the __ jury was 
unfair, prejudicial, etc. If such were the cas~, th~ jury should 
never have been passed for cause. 
C. DEFENDANT "WAIVED". RIGHT TO OBJECT TO JURY. 
Furthermore, defendant's counsel learned of the so-called 
"exclusion" of elk hunters, prior to the issue bein'1 submitted to 
the jury, and made _!!Q protests officially or unofficially. 
Having been charged with the knowledge prior to the jury 
deliberations and chosing not to object to.,, the Clerk's actions 
until after the jury had deliberated and reached a verdict 
unfavorable to defendant, is simply unfair. Plaintiffs believe 
defendant waived its right to object both at that time and on 
appeal. 
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POINT V 
THE AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES WAS PROPER AND 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR THE JURY TO 
AWARD THE SAME. 
A. JURY'S ROLE IN THIS CASE. 
Defendant misses the point of the jury's role in this case. 
The jury was not asked to assess the damages in the manner 
defendant suggests. The jury's function was to first determine 
certain facts by answering certain questions. The questions the 
jurors answered were primarily framed by the defendant's counsel, 
which the court modified in order to comply with the direction 
the trial had taken. The jurors were specifically cautioned not 
to worry about the legal consequences of their answers (See T. 
pgs. 875, lines 27-30: and 876, lines 1-9), but to answer each 
question from the facts as they found them. 
B. GROUNDS FOR AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
While plaintiffs agree with defendant that "wilful and 
malicious" are grounds for awarding punitive damages, plaintiffs 
hasten to draw defendant's attention to the fact that a "reckless 
indifference and disregard for the rights of the plaintiffs" may 
establish the willful conduct. This court has stated the 
principle as follows: 
It is true that punitive damages are usually associated 
with other types of tortious injury. But under proper 
circumstances they may be allowed in cases of 
trespass .•• If the wrongful act by which one injures 
another is done wilfully and maliciously our law allows 
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the imposition of punitive damages as a punishment to 
the defendant for such conduct and as a warning to him 
and others against it. In view of the fact that the 
plaintiff's evidence showed that even after repeated 
warn~ngs and r~monstrar:ices the -aefenaant' s wrong 
continually persisted with an indifference to the 
consequences. and to plaintrff 1 S-rights, the triaY-court 
c?rrectly subm~~ted the issue to the ~ as to whether 
his conduct was wilful and ~malicious and allowed the 
assessment of punitive damages. Powers ~Taylor, 379 
P.2d 3801 14 Ut.2d 152, pg. 382). (emphasis added). 
C. MALICE "IMPLIED" FROM CONDUCT. 
In Terry~ Zions Co-op Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314 
(Utah, 1979), the Utah. court makes an even clearer statement as 
to what is required to establi.s.h'. the malice essential for an 
award of punitive damages~ 
This presumed malice or malice ,,in law does not consist 
of personal hate or ill will of one person towards 
another, but rather refers to that state of mind which 
is reckless of law and of the iegal rTghtsOf the 
Citizen in a person's conduct towards that 
citizen •.. In such cases malice in law will be 
im;elied from unjustifiable conduct which causes the 
in Jury complained of or from a wrongful act 
intentionally. done without cause or excuse. (at pg. 
327) (emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs argued to the jury that defendant's actions of 
continually dumping pollution, after warnings by the plaintiffs, 
by State officials, and others, were evidence of a reckless 
indifference to plaintiffs' rights. The court correctly 
instructed the jury as to what they had to find in order to 
recommend an amount for punitive damages (See Instruction No. 
10). Presumably the jury found defendant's unjustifiable conduct 
and disregard for plaintiffs' property rights constituted the 
wilful and maliC±ou$ conduct required in order to award punitive 
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damages. Defendant has made no showing that the evidence would 
not support that finding by the triers of the fact. Certainly 
the defendant has the burden of showing there was no evidence to 
support an award for punitive damages if it is going to object to 
the same. 
D. PURPOSE OF EXEMPLARY OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
The real question involved is whether passion rather than 
reason dictated the answers of the jury. Driesbach ~ Lynch, 259 
P.2d 1039 (Idaho, 1953). The purpose of exemplary damages is to 
punish the defendant, and to deter the defendant and others from 
engaging in similar conduct, and the jury was so instructed. 
[See Nash v. Craig Co., Inc., 585 P.2d 775 (Utah 1978); Terry~ 
Zions Co-op Mercantile Inst., op cit.; Palombi ~ Q ~~Builders, 
452 P.2d 325 (Utah, 1969); Evans~ Gaisford, 247 P.2d 431 (Utah, 
1952)]. While historically exemplary damages should bear a 
reasonable relation to actual damages, other factors, such as 
wealth of the wrongdoer, the ability of the wrongdoer to pay and 
culpability of defendant must be considered. 
Co-op Mercantile Institute, this court said: 
This court recently stated that "while the cases 
generally hold that the amount of punitive damages must 
bear some reasonable relation to the amount of actual 
damages awarded, this is not necessarily true." The 
purpose of a punitive or exemplary damage award is not 
to compensate the ~ harmed but rather to pun~sh the 
wrongdoer, to deter him from similar acts in the 
future, and to provide fair warning to others similarly 
situated that such conduct is not tolerated. 
Due to the purposes underlying the award of punitive 
damages many factors contribute in determining their 
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appropriate measure. While the amount of compensatory 
damages awarded is one such factor, it is not the 
exclusive one. The jury in its original decision or 
the court in its review of that decision must also 
consider the particular nature of the defendant's acts, 
the probability of tho~e acts being repeated in the 
future, and the relative wealth of· the particular 
defendant. (at 328) (emphasis added)- --
In the Terry case} 'the majority opinion also quoted approvingly 
from a California decision of Neal '!!..:__ Farmers Insurance Exchange, 
582 P.2d 980, 990 (Calif..- 1978). relative to punitive damages as 
follows: 
obviously the function of deterence ••• will not be 
served if the weal th of the defendant allows him to 
absorb the award with little or no discomfort. 
[See also Prince'!!..:.... Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325, (Utah, 1975), Wilson 
'!!..:....Oldroyd, 267 P.2d 759 (Utah, 1954): Holdaway'!!..:__ Hall, 505 P.2d 
295 (Utah, 1973)]. Needless to say, if large corporations or 
wealthy individuals can at will engage in culpable conduct, such 
as we have in Branch '!!..:.... Western Petroleum, where the defendant 
persists in unlawful actions which pollute the culinary water 
and/or land of its neighbor, and then expect no substantial 
punishment, other than to merely pay the 'reasonable rental value 
of that land and the consequential damage, then such parties 
would, in effect, be at liberty to engage in private 
condemnations of neighboring lands with impunity. 
E. JURY VERDICT PRESUMED TO BE FAIR AND MADE WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 
The fury was the trier of the facts. They heard the 
testimony. They observed the demeanor of the witnesses. They 
heard and judged the "particular nature" of the defendant's acts 
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and found them wilful and wanton, based on defendant's "reckless 
disregard of plaintiffs' rights." The jury was asked to assess 
what the punitive damages should be, without considering the 
effects of their decision. They did so, and defendant now 
protests without any showing of actual prejudice, passion or 
unfairness on the part of the jury. A jury is to be presumed to 
have acted properly and rationally and mere disapproval of their 
verdict should not be grounds for a reversal, without a showing 
that the amount awarded is so "shocking to one's conscience" as 
to "constitute passion, prejudice or corruption." (See Terry~ 
Zions Co-op Mercantile Institute, supra, at 328). 
F. JURY AWARD WAS NOT EXCESSIVE. 
The amount of the punitive damages awarded to plaintiffs was 
clearly not much more than minimal, when the brazenness of 
defendant's acts, the period of time involved, the wealth of the 
defendant, and all of the damages, including the amount the jury 
felt should be given for mental suffering, are considered. 
Considering the purpose of punishing culpable conduct, and 
effectively detering such conduct in the future, which purposes 
necessitate the consideration of defendant's ability to pay, and 
that defendant is a million dollar corporation, then perhaps the 
amount of punitive damages should have been four or five times 
larger than it was. Based on the stated criteria, as well as the 
defendant's wealth and the blatant nature of its actions, an even 
larger award than was given by the jury would still have 
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reasonably related both to the actual damages and served as an 
effective deterent to the defendant and others from repeating 
their acts. 
G. DEFENDANT'S SUGGESTION OF PASSION AND/OR PREJUDICE UNFOUNDED. 
Response should also be made to defen~~nt's unsubstantiated 
and passing suggestion or allegation that the jury's award was 
made---under: the influence of passion or prejudice. surely 
defendant had its tongue in cheek with .• such a comment. It should 
be recalled that: 1) the defendant passed the jury for cause 
when the trial commenced; 2) the jury promised under oath, to be 
fa.ir and impartial. (Plaintiffs believe that in absence of 
evidence to the co~~rary, e..ach juror should be presumed to have 
answered that promise. truthfully and honestly); 3) there is no 
evidence, and defendant doe~ not suggest there is any, that any 
juror, singularly, or collectively was prejudicial against the 
defendant, either before, during the trial, or during jury 
deliberations; 4) this jury was an outstanding cross section of 
the community. [There were four males and four females. It 
consisted of the Superintendent of Schools, a ~ighway patrolman, 
a former deputy sheriff (currently a Department of Transportation 
employee), a farmer-rancher, the county recorder, a high school 
secretary_,. and two housewives, one of whose husband was a 
pharmici.s.t and the other whose husband was retired. Four were 
from the Roosevelt area and four were from the Duchesne area.] 
Few juries anywhere could be much more representative of a county 
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than this jury was; 5) just because the defendant doesn't agree 
with the conclusion of the eight jurors does not make the jury 
prejudiced. 
H. SUMMARY. 
Defendant suggests that the jury was prejudiced because the 
jury awarded plaintiff punitive damages and damages for mental 
suffering or annoyance, even though "everything the defendant did 
was on its own land." Defendant overlooks that while the harm 
started on its own land, it soon moved to the plaintiffs' land. 
Perhaps defendant's tunnel vision is why we had to have a lawsuit 
to begin with. If defendant had been more considerate of others 
and had looked beyond how much money it was saving by literally 
dumping its pollutants on top of the plaintiffs, this lawsuit 
would never have been necessary. Now that the jury has required 
the defendant to compensate the plaintiffs for defendant's 
profitable, but tortious acts, defendant claims that the jury was 
unfair, the verdict was excessive, etc. Defendant should broaden 
its perspective by thinking and listening to what others in the 
community feel about its conduct and actions. Plaintiffs feel 
that under the circumstances, i.e., since for 32 months defendant 
persisted in its unlawful activities, knowing what it was doing, 
the jury was conservative in its award. With another jury and 
another trial, the aggregate damages might well be considerably 
more. Furthermore, defendant's trespass and polluting was not a 
singular act, but a continuing one from February, 1977, through 
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l 
November, 1979. Surely defendant did not think that a reasonable 
jury would limit its award to a single incident. 
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- PLAINTIFFS' CROSS APPEAL -
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN STRIKING THE JURY AWARD 
FOR MENTAL SUFFERING AND SAID AWARD SHOULD BE 
REINSTATED 
A. INTRODUCTION. 
At the end of plaintiffs' case, the court ruled that as a 
matter of law it would not permit plaintiffs' claim for emotional 
distress, discomfort and annoyance. However, after reviewing 
numerous cases [See Daluiso ~Boone, 455 P.2d 811 (Calif., 1969); 
Acadia, Calif., Ltd. ~ Herbert, 353 P.2d 294 (Calif., 1960); 
Valley Development Co. ~Weeks, 364 P.2d 730 (Colo., 1961); 
Rodriguez ~ State, 472 P.2d 509 (Hawaii, 1970); Murphy~ City 
of Tacoma, 374 P.2d 976 (Wash., 1962); Gruenberg v. Aetnalus Co., 
510 P.2d 1032 (Calif. 1973); Edwards~ Talent Irrigation Dis., 
supra; Drake ~ Smith, supra] the court was convinced of the 
error of its earlier ruling as to what the law was on the issue 
of mental suffering and agreed to submit the question to the 
jury. 
B. ISSUE OF MENTAL SUFFERING PROPERLY PLEAD AND TRIED. 
Defendant had long known of plaintiffs' claim for such 
relief as is set forth in the Fourth Cause of Action in 
plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. In addition, at the end of 
defendant's defense, plaintiffs asked to re-open their case in 
chief, and without objection from the defendant, the court 
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authorized the- same. (See T .. Pg. 796, lines 3-6). Thus, when 
plaintiffs re-opened their case, the plaintiffs were entitled to 
present such evidence as they felt necessary to substantiate 
their damage claims ..•... Defendant made_ no objection to that 
testimony, but rather adcnowledged plaintiffs' right to do so by 
cross-examining the plaintiffs and witnesses on the matters 
rais-ed on direct examination. (See T. pg. 803, lines 27+}. 
The plaintiffs' statement of. facts sets forth the evidence 
that the jury heard to conclude that the plaintiffs had suffered 
"emotional distress, discomfort and annoyance," because of 
defendant's w~ongful acts. The defendant maqe _ .!!2. attempt to 
offer any evidence to rebut the clear and consise evidence 
presented by the plaintiffs. 
C. JURY ADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED ON ISSUE 
Plaintiffs believe and urge that by reading all of the jury 
instructions, as the jury was instructed to do in Instruction 
# 16, the jurors, as the triers of the fact, were adequately 
instructed so as to answer the question ion mental suffering or 
emotional stress. While defendant did object to question 118 on 
mental suffering, etc., being put to the jurors, defendant did 
not object to the lack of ~ instructions on the subject. 
Thus, the "form" of the question and the jury instructions was 
apparently approved by the defendant. Apparently it was the 
remedy, i .e-., the question of menta·l suffering itself that is and 
was objectionable to the d.e.f.endant. Why the trial court would 
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subsequently hold that plaintiffs had not olead mental suffering, 
discomfort or annoyance or if plead and proved, that the jury was 
not adequately instructed, is beyond the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs 
urge that the record is clear that: plaintiffs properly plead the 
matter; proved the matter; and, the jury was adequately 
instructed in the law so as to answer the relatively simple 
questions submitted by the court. 
D. FINDINGS OF JURY. 
The jury could only answer Question 18 on mental suffering, 
etc., if it answered questions 2 and 7. When Question 18 is read 
in conjunction with Questions 2 and 7, to which specific 
reference is made in the language introducing Question 18, no 
possible doubt could exist in the mind of a reasonable juror as 
to what action of the defendant was being referred to in said 
Question 18. Question 2 stated: 
Do you find defendant's use of its evaporation pits for 
the dumping of formation water is a cause of the 
pollution of the water in plaintiff's diligence well? 
Interrogatory 7 stated: 
Do you find that defendant's use of the evaporation pit 
by the dumping of formation water is a cause of the 
pollution of the water in plaintiff's new well? 
The fact that interrogatories 2 and 7 were referenced to 
interrogatory 18, and the fact that no other interrogatories 
dealt with any other possible causes of pollution, makes clear 
that the jury was to only find the damages resulting from 
defendant's actions and no one elses. The jurors, as intelligent 
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men and women, and even in the absence of any reference to 
interrogatories 2 and 7, would no doubt have realized that, as 
they were to find the damages which defendant caused, and in so 
doing, defendant's culpable actions and the effects of those 
actions were the only factors being weighed. The defendant, and 
impliedly the court, passed each of the eight (8) jurors for 
cause. Neither should now "back door" that approval by 
questioning the capacity of the jury to reason and think in 
determining whether plaintiffs sustained "emotional distress, 
discomfort or annoyance," i.e., emotional distress ·by reason of 
defendant's ac~ions~- Each of those words are of such general use 
and understanding that an instruction defining them was the~ and 
still is unnecessary. Reasonable jurors could reasonabl~; be 
expected to understand what those words meant. As indicated -in 
Point v, Subpoint G-4, when considering the exceptional cross-
section of the community that this jury represented. it surely is 
to be presumed they understood what those "everyday" words meant. 
Again, when the trial judge gave the jury .. instructions, the 
defendant did not object to the lack of ins~ructions defining the 
meaning of the words, and no objection should now be heard. 
This jury, as representatives of a broad spectrum of the 
community, were not and are not the kind of individuals who would 
be given to passion, prejudice, etc. Remember there was the 
Superintendent of Schools, a highway patrolman, a former deputy 
sheriff, the County Recorder, a school secretary,. .. a farmer-
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rancher, and two housewives. They tried the case well and based 
their decision only upon the evidence before them. Their 
unanimous finding was fair, just, and equitable and should not 
have been disturbed. 
E. PLAINTIFFS NOT OBLIGATED 
OF INTENTIONAL--INFLICTION 
PLAINTIFFS ONLY OBLIGATED TO 
AS AN ELEMENT OF DAMAGES. 
TO PLEAD AND PROVE ELEMENTS OF TORT 
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS; RATHER, 
PLEAD AND PROVE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
It should again be stressed that defendant did not object to 
the court's failure to instruct the~ on emotional distress at 
the time of trial. 
Defendant's reckless indifference to the plaintiffs' rights 
was specifically found by the jury to be "wilful and malicious." 
Because the jury found defendant's conduct more than negligent, 
i.e., "willful, malicious or reckless," then under Section 46 of 
the Restatement of Torts 2nd (1965), physical injury is not a 
prerequisite to awarding damages for mental suffering. Likewise, 
the court's suggestion that a "separate cause of action" was 
necessary, is a misstatement or misapplication of the law. [See 
Murphy ~ City of Tocoma, supra, and Drake ~ Smith, supra, in 
which damaqes for "annoyance and inconveniences" were allowed to 
a plaintiff where a domestic water supply had been polluted. 
Arguably, the basis for these above decisions was that pollution 
of a household water supply may be regarded as a physical 
invasion of the person or the occupant. Al so of interest is 
Edwards ~Talent Irrigation Dist, supra, which held that damages 
for mental anguish are recoverable in a negligent action when 
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they are a result.. of defendant's interference with the use and 
enjoyment of plaintiff's land.] 
The California Court in Gruenburg ~ ~ Life Insurance 
Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1041 (Calif., 1973), quoted its earlier 
decision in Cris-ct. v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d _1)3 (Calif, 
1967), as follows: 
Defendants mistakenly rely on Section 46 Restatement 
Torts 2nd .•• Comment "a" to that section states that 
it is intended to apply only to the independent tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. To be 
distinguished, co!1llllent "b" explains are those cases in 
which "emotional distress may be an element of 
damages. • • where other interests have been invaded, 
and tort liability has arisen apart from emotional 
distress .• 
The court went op to explain that··-
The more .;exacting requirements, .. of Section 46 are 
applied, the same comment states, to the independent 
tort (i.e., intentional infliction of emotional 
distress) "[b]ecause of the fear of fictitious or 
trivial claims, distrust of proof offered, and the 
difficulty of setting up any satisfactory boundaries to 
liability ••• ~ Since in the present case we are 
concerned with mental distress resulting from a 
substantial invasion o.f. property interests of the 
insured and not with .. the independent tort of 
intentional· infliction of- emotional distress, we deem 
Section !§_ to be inapPficable." at 1041 (emphasis 
added). 
Plaintiffs bel.ieve that decision to be good law for this Court to 
apply in this case as hereafter suggested. 
F. INTERFERENCE WITH PERSONAL AND/OR PROPERTY RIGHTS. 
I~ Branch ~ western Petroleum, plaintiffs are suing for 
substantial interference with theb:, property rights. Mental 
suffering, emotional distress+: .Q.iscomfort, and annoyance were 
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feelings, conditions, etc., that naturally arose or flowed from 
defendant's wrongful acts and invasion of plaintiffs' rights. 
The court's conclusion, six months after the fact, that the jury 
was not properly instructed on this issue is simply incorrect. 
An instruction as to the requirements for the independent tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress would definitely 
have been out of place and error, because that was neither 
plaintiffs' theory nor the proof plaintiffs offered. 
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the landmark Utah 
Ca-se of Samms~ Ecceles, 358 P.2d 344 (1961), which was argued 
extensively by defendant to the trial court, deals exclusively 
with the independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress and not with mental suffering arising or flowing from a 
reckless or intentional invasion of plaintiffs' personal or 
property rights. At the time of the trial the court agreed that 
Eccles did not govern this factual situation. But, six months 
later, the court reversed itself and adopted the defendant's 
theory, as set forth in the Eccles case, without apparent regard 
for the facts. The holding in the Eccles case should not be 
applicable to this factual situation for the reasons set forth in 
the Restatement and as applied by the California court which 
stated: 
In accordance with the general rule, it is settled in 
this state that mental suffering constitutes an 
aggravation of damages when it naturally ensues from 
the act complained of •.• damages for mental distress 
have also been awarded in cases where the tortious 
conduct was in interference with property rights 
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without any personal injuries apart from the mental 
distress. Crisci ~Security Ins. Co., supra. 
Plaintiffs further urge that while any award by a jury or a r 
court can easily be dismissed as being "speculative," that be£ore 
the cour't summarily dismisses such an··award, a specific finding 
of that "speculation" should be reached. Originally the court's 
judgment awarded plaintiffs the damages for mental suffering, 
However, defendant persisted in its original objections. 
More than six months later, after the issues and facts were 
"stale" in the mind of the court, an~ numerous other cases had 
passed under the bridge, the trial court reversed itself and 
struck the finding by- the jury. Why? S.urely a conclusionary 
statement that the award was speculative is not enough. At the 
time of the trial, with the evidence fresh in its mind, the claim 
was allowed. Now on appeal, with the relevant evidence being 
recalled, and the reasoning behind the claim for damages being 
re-examined, this court should reinstate that claim. 
G. SUMMARY. 
Plaintiffs urge on cross-appeal that the jury award for 
mental suffering, discomfort or annoyance be rein&tated. The 
plaintiffs properly plead and proved the same. In this case the 
mental suffering is not an independent tort, but is one that 
arises from defendant's wilful and wanton damage to plaintiffs' 
property. The jury was<iafdequately instr~ed so as to be able to 
answer the questions of the-·eottrt, including the amount necessary 
to compensate plaintiffs for ·mental suffering, discomfort or 
annoyance. The jury award should be reinstated. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs urge the court to find that: 
1. Plaintiffs properly plead, proved and established all of 
their claims; 
2. The jury was properly selected and even if not, 
defendant can show no actual prejudice so that a fair and 
impartial jury was not selected; 
3. The instructions of the trial court were adequate and 
sufficient to assist the jury in answering all questions posed by 
the court; 
4. The jury was fair, competent, impartial and an 
outstanding cross-section of the entire community; 
5. The claim for mental suffering, discomfort or annoyance 
is not an independent tort, but one which "flows" from the wilful 
and reckless acts of the wrongdoer by invading plaintiffs' rights 
and property; 
6. All of the jury findings were fair, reasonable and have 
no appearance of being subject to passion, prejudice or emotion; 
7. All of the jury findings should be approved by this 
court, including the 
annoyance suffered by 
arising from the same; 
mental suffering, discomfort 
the plaintiffs, together with 
and/or 
damages 
8. Defendant's appeal should be denied and plaintiffs' 
cross-appeal should be granted. 
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Respectfully submitted this 5th day of November, 1980. 
MANGAN & GILLESPIE 
::w~ 
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